By Kavita Mistry 
The story so far: On October 17, China’s Defence Ministry spokesperson Zhang Xiaogang announced the expulsion of nine high-ranking military commanders, who held posts in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the Central Military Commission (CMC), from the Communist Party of China (CPC). Some of these individuals have been reported missing, and had already been removed from their military posts.
Why were they expelled?
The official line states that these nine individuals seriously violated party discipline and were suspected of major duty-related crimes involving “extraordinarily large sums of money”. The party disciplinary regulations of the CPC stipulate five types of disciplinary sanctions for party members — warnings, serious warnings, removal from internal party posts, probation, and expulsion. Expulsion from the party is the highest disciplinary action within the CPC.
Is this the first such instance?
Of the nine individuals targeted, five of the highest-ranking officials include He Weidong, member of the CPC Politburo and Vice Chairman of the CMC, Miao Hua, former Director of the CMC Political Work Department (PWD), He Hongjun, former Executive Deputy Director of the CMC PWD, Wang Xiubin, former Executive Deputy Director of the CMC Joint Operations Command Center, and Lin Xiangyang, former Commander of the Eastern Theater Command.
These purges are the latest in a long line of corruption-related disappearances and expulsions in the PLA and the CMC over the past decade. In the past two years in particular, Chinese President Xi Jinping’s wide-sweeping anti-graft campaign has targeted higher-ranking officials, including CMC members, defence ministers, and now, even a CMC Vice-chairman — He Weidong. Given that the CMC is the most powerful body of the CPC and is in charge of the PLA and China’s overall national security apparatus, its leaders are always held to a higher standard. This means that their expulsion is a cause for grave concern vis-à-vis efficiency and preparedness in the military. Moreover, He Weidong is a close aide of Mr. Xi himself, and had worked closely with him during their overlapping stints in the Fujian province, where Mr. Xi rose up the ranks from deputy mayor of Xiamen city in 1985 to Governor of the province in 1999, while Mr. He rose up the ranks in the 91st Army Division, and then the 31st Group Army.
The reasons behind these expulsions are manifold, and are tied with the common thread of wavering commitment to Party ideals, discipline, and the goal of turning the PLA into an efficient and “world-class” fighting force. Officially, the decision to remove and prosecute multiple individuals in the past few years is a crucial step in deepening the party’s campaign for “clean governance and strict discipline.” Chinese commentators have argued that there is a direct link between today’s cases and the lingering influence of disgraced former CMC vice-chairmen Guo Boxiong and Xu Caihou, whose downfall marked the beginning of the military’s modern anti-graft era. The new purge is described as a continuation of that struggle.
What about internal politics?
He Weidong, Miao Hua, Lin Xiangyang and Wang Xiubin are all linked to a singular patron-client network headed by Mr. He himself. They have all, in the past, been associated with each other through their own diverse roles, or through Mr. Xi’s tenure, in Fujian. Together, they form what may be referred to as the “Fujian gang” in the Chinese military, with Mr. Xi at its very top. The Fujian gang is closely tied to China’s Taiwan war plans, and all its officials are tied to the goal of ‘reunification’. Today, their clique can be pitted against the presence of a strong “Shaanxi gang” in the military, led by CMC first vice-chairman Zhang Youxia. If one looks at Zhang’s so-called “Shaanxi gang,” CMC member and Discipline Inspection lead Zhang Shengmin figures right on top. He was born in Shaanxi and served with the pre-2015-reform Second Artillery force for a long time, before joining the Discipline Inspection Commission of the CMC as Secretary in 2017. Both the Zhangs have a shared history of working with the PLA ground forces, and it is no surprise that Zhang Shengmin is now the CMC’s second vice-chairman, after having long served as a tough anti-corruption czar for the Commission.
What is the way ahead?
From the similarities and differences in the targeted candidates’ backgrounds, one can infer that there is both, a factional component and a corruption-related element to the latest purges. The fall of these nine individuals is unique due to its sheer size, the targeting of some of the highest-ranking officials, and the prima facie thread connecting them all to one another. However, amid all the uncertainties, one thing is certain — that if the very leaders of the PLA as a whole are corrupt, it is bound to create tensions at the grassroots. If morale is impacted, it will lead to drastic implications for the PLA’s combat preparedness, especially on the Taiwan front. On the other hand, it is likely that Mr. Xi will double down on purity-related measures in the PLA, bringing more units under the direct control of the CMC.
Anushka Saxena works with the Takshashila Institution.